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NED W. WAXMAN*
In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,1 the United States Supreme Court
held that the seventh amendment right to a trial by jury applies in certain
kinds of bankruptcy proceedings. Pursuant to this ruling, a party is entitled
to a jury trial if the proceeding meets the following three-part test enunciated
by the Court: (1) the cause of action would have been brought at law (and
not in equity) in 18th-century England before the courts merged, (2) the
remedy sought is characterized as legal (as opposed to equitable), and (3) the
proceeding does not concern a public right that can be and has been assigned
to an article I court lacking a jury (i.e., the proceeding must involve a
private right).2 Also, entitlement to a jury trial requires that the party
making the jury demand not have filed a claim against the estate in the
bankruptcy case.3 The Court, however, explicitly declined to decide whether
the bankruptcy court has the statutory or constitutional authority to conduct
a trial by jury when that right exists.' Subsequently, several federal courts
of appeals have ruled on the bankruptcy court's power to conduct a jury trial,
resulting in a split of authority and an open-ended dilemma facing bankruptcy
judges, attorneys, creditors, debtors, and trustees throughout the nation.
Inasmuch as the Supreme Court dodged the issue in Granfinanciera, and
abdicated its responsibility, first, by failing to decide In re Ben Cooper,
Inc.5 after having granted certiorari, and, second, by denying a subsequent
petition for certiorari in May of 1991, the purpose of this Article is to
propose congressional action that will resolve the problem in a manner that
" Associate Professor, College of William and Mary, Graduate School of Business
Administration; Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, B.S., 1970; Emory
University School of Law, J.D., 1975; Law Clerk for the Honorable Frank A. Hooper
(U.S. District Judge); Law Clerk for the Honorable W. Homer Drake, Jr. (U.S.
Bankruptcy Judge); Associate, Macey and Zusmann, Atlanta, Georgia; Estate
Administrator, Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Georgia.
' 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
2 Id. at 42.
' Langenkamp v. Culp, 111 S. Ct. 330 (1990); Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 58-59;
Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336-37 (1966).
4 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 64.
5 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 3269, vacated and remanded,
111 S. Ct. 425 (1990), opinion reinstated, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2041 (1991).
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passes constitutional muster and that has the significant and far-reaching
effects of judicial economy and efficiency.
When Congress enacted the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act,6 which
became effective on October 1, 1979, one of the main purposes was to create
an independent court with broad jurisdiction to determine all matters that
would arise under the Bankruptcy Code, or in or related to a bankruptcy
case, and to eliminate the pre-Code concepts of summary and plenary
jurisdiction that had existed under the Bankruptcy Act. In 1982, in Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. [hereinafter referred to as
Marathon],7 the Supreme Court declared this broad grant of jurisdiction to
the bankruptcy courts unconstitutional, and congressional debate ensued for
the next two years. At that time, one of the proposals to cure the
jurisdictional infirmities was to make the bankruptcy court an article III
court, thus granting life tenure to the bankruptcy judges along with the
safeguard of no diminution of salary.'
While, by hindsight, this would have been the most appropriate solution,
it was not adopted. In the words of Representative Kindness: "One answer
is, OK, let us go with article III judges. That is expensive. That is the Rolls
Royce choice. Let us try a tuneup instead."' Hence, the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 [hereinafter referred to as
"the 1984 Amendments"]10 did not provide article III status for the
bankruptcy court but, instead, designated the bankruptcy court as a unit of
the district court," which was given original jurisdiction over bankruptcy
cases and proceedings" as well as the authority to refer such cases and
proceedings to the bankruptcy court, 3 except proceedings involving
personal injury tort or wrongful death. 4 The 1984 Amendments also
created categories for bankruptcy proceedings, designating them as core and
noncore, and Congress provided for the bankruptcy court to have the power
to enter final orders and judgments in core proceedings, but not without
6 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
7 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
8 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
9 130 CoNG. REc. H1811 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984) (statement of Representative
Kindness).
10 Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333.
11 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1990).
12 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1990).
13 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1990). It is common practice for almost all bankruptcy cases
and proceedings to be referred to the bankruptcy court under this provision.
14 28 U.S.C. § 157b)(5) (1990).
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consent of all parties in noncore proceedings (in which the bankruptcy court
must recommend proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the
district court, which then enters the final order or judgment after de novo
review of any contested matters).15
The 1984 Amendments also repealed 28 U.S.C. section 1480, which
was the relevant statutory provision concerning jury trials and which, in
effect, preserved any existing right to trial by jury (other than certain issues
concerning involuntary bankruptcy petitions). In its place, Congress enacted
28 U.S.C. section 1411, which states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this chapter and
title 11 do not affect any right to trial by jury that an individual has under
applicable nonbankruptcy law with regard to a personal injury or wrongful
death tort claim.
(b) The district court may order the issues arising under section 303 of
title 11 to be tried without a jury.
It is this rather ambiguous language, coupled with the absence of any
express congressional intent to grant or not to grant the power to try jury
cases to the bankruptcy court, that has resulted in the split of authority
among the circuits on this issue. The first case decided at the appellate level
was Ben Cooper,16 in which the Second Circuit held that the bankruptcy
court may conduct jury trials in core proceedings. Note that it is generally
agreed that, under the present jurisdictional framework, bankruptcy judges
cannot conduct jury trials without consent in noncore proceedings since the
"reexamination clause" of the seventh amendment would be violated when
the district judge reviews de novo any contested findings of fact or
conclusions of law. 7 The Second Circuit based its decision on two
independent statutory provisions, 28 U.S.C. section 157(b), which grants the
bankruptcy judges the power to conduct trials and to enter final orders and
judgments in core proceedings, and 28 U.S.C. section 151, which authorizes
each bankruptcy judge as a judicial officer of the district court to "exercise
15 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)-(c) (1990).
16 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 3269, vacated and remanded,
111 S. Ct. 425 (1990), opinion reinstated, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2041 (1991).
17 In re Cinematronics, Inc., 916 F.2d 1444, 1451 (9th Cir. 1990); Beard v.
Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 443 (3d Cir. 1990). The "reexamination clause" states that
"no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States,
than according to the rules of common law." Cinematronics, 916 F.2d at 1451, quoting
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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the authority conferred under this chapter with respect to any action, suit, or
proceeding and [to] preside alone and hold a regular or special session of the
court. .. ." These provisions, construed in a manner that can be reconciled
with the Supreme Court's decision in Granfinanciera, serve as a legally
sufficient basis for the bankruptcy court to conduct jury trials, according to
the Second Circuit. 18
The court in Ben Cooper also was satisfied that jury trials in the
bankruptcy court in core proceedings would not violate either article III of
the Constitution or the seventh amendment. In this regard, the court stated:
If bankruptcy courts have the power to enter final judgments without
violating Article III, it follows that jury verdicts in the bankruptcy courts
do not violate Article rI. The primary purpose of this Article is to ensure
a federal judiciary free from pressure from the other branches of
government .... If anything, jurors are less likely to feel pressure from
the executive and legislative branches than are bankruptcy judges, who
depend on the other branches for reappointment to office. 9
The Second Circuit also relied on cases upholding the authority of article I
judges to conduct jury trials when not otherwise violative of article
In-specifically, in the instances of District of Columbia judges' and
federal magistrates.21 With respect to the seventh amendment, the Second
Circuit found no constitutional problem since any facts determined by a jury
in a core proceeding would not be subject to reexamination in the district
court, functioning in its appellate capacity in reviewing final orders and
judgments of the bankruptcy court (as distinguished from de novo review of
proposed findings in noncore proceedings).' Thus, the court in Ben Cooper
decided that jury trials in core proceedings are statutorily and constitutionally
permissible in the bankruptcy court.'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,' and oral
arguments in Ben Cooper were scheduled for December 3, 1990. However,
instead of deciding the issue, which affects thousands of debtors and creditors
in bankruptcy cases throughout the country, the Supreme Court vacated the
judgment of the Second Circuit and remanded the case on account of a
18 896 F.2d at 1402.
19 Id. at 1403 (citations omitted).
20 Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
21 Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984).
1 Ben Cooper, 896 F.2d at 1403.
23M. at 1404.
24 110 S. Ct. 3269 (1990).
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jurisdictional question concerning whether there was an appeal of a final
order.' This issue had not been raised by either the petitioner or the
respondent but was addressed, in favor of jurisdiction being proper, in a
brief filed by the United States, which had intervened because of the national
significance of the issue in this case. On remand, the Second Circuit ruled
that jurisdiction is proper, basically agreeing with the position taken by the
United States in its brief, and the court reinstated its previous judgment and
opinion at 896 F.2d 1394.' In May, 1991, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.2'
The other two circuits that have considered the issue at hand have held
that bankruptcy judges are not authorized to conduct jury trials. The Eighth
Circuit, in the case of In re United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, N.A.,2
ruled that there is no statutory basis for jury trials in the bankruptcy court
and that, therefore, it would not be necessary to address the constitutional
questions. The case involved a core proceeding, in the nature of an alleged
preferential transfer, and both the bankruptcy court and the district court
found that the jury trial could be conducted by the bankruptcy judge. On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, explaining that neither 28 U.S.C. section
157, nor any other provision of the 1984 Amendments, contains any express
language authorizing the bankruptcy court to hold jury trials.29 The Eighth
Circuit stressed the fact that, in contrast, Congress has given express
statutory authority to federal magistrates to conduct jury trials (with consent)
in certain kinds of proceedings.' Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit refused
to find any implied authority since "the power to conduct jury trials is not
indispensable to bankruptcy judges' ability to execute the authority conferred
by the 1984 Act."31 The court stated: "In fact, it appears Congress did not
even consider the need to provide jury trial authority."32 Moreover, after
Marathon, "Congress, at the time of the 1984 Act, was extremely wary of
its authority to clothe Article I courts with Article III powers."33
25 111 S. Ct. 425 (1990).
26 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1991).
Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania v. Ben Cooper, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991).
28 901 F.2d 1449 (8th Cir. 1990).
29 Id. at 1454.
30 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3), (c)(1)).
31 Id. at 1456.
32 Id.
33 Id.
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Similarly, the Tenth Circuit, in the case of In re Kaiser Steel Corp. ,'
which also involved core proceedings, held that bankruptcy judges are not
authorized to conduct jury trials. The court stated:
We reach our decision on statutory grounds, interpreted in light of the
Supreme Court's decision [in Marathon] invalidating the bankruptcy
jurisdictional scheme established by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
... and Congress's response in enacting the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.... Although Congress may have granted
bankruptcy judges the authority to conduct jury trials under the broad
jurisdictional provisions of the 1978 Act, . . . we find that such authority
does not exist under the 1984 Act.35
In support of its ruling, the court pointed out that both 28 U.S.C.
section 1471(c) (which provided for the bankruptcy court to "exercise all of
the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the district courts") and 28
U.S.C. section 1481 (which, with two exceptions not applicable here,
granted to the bankruptcy court "the powers of a court of equity, law and
admiralty . . .") were repealed in response to Marathon, and that these
provisions were replaced by the present jurisdictional scheme, which
designates the bankruptcy court as a unit of the district court and creates the
statutory categories of core and noncore proceedings.36 The Tenth Circuit
also emphasized that, under the 1984 jurisdictional scheme, the bankruptcy
judges were given "the personal power to hear and determine cases," and
that such fact-finding power cannot be delegated to a jury.37 Finally, this
court, as did the court in United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, N.A., also
relied on the lack of any express authorization for the bankruptcy court to
conduct jury trials, in contrast with Congress's express authorization for jury
trials to be held by federal magistrates with consent.3"
Thus, the posture of the issue of whether or not bankruptcy judges may
try jury cases is as follows: The appellate courts are divided, the Supreme
Court has avoided the question on three occasions, and Congress has failed
to express its intention.
The most appropriate solution, constitutionally and pragmatically, is to
make the bankruptcy court an article III court with life tenure and no
34 911 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1990).
3 Id. at 389.
3 Id. at 389-90.
37 1d. at 391.
38 Id. at 391-92.
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diminution of salary.39 The purpose of these safeguards is to make certain
that the judicial branch of government is independent from the legislature and
the executive branch, 4' and the rationale for such independence can be
traced to the concern of the framers of our Constitution that the United States
of America not parallel England, where "the King of Great Britain ... had
'made judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and
the amount and payment of their salaries.'" 41 In this regard, Alexander
Hamilton stated: "Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more
to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support
... . In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's
subsistence amounts to a power over his will."42
The advantages of creating an article III bankruptcy court would be: (1)
resolution of the jury trial issue in a constitutional manner, (2) jurisdiction
in one independent court of all bankruptcy cases and proceedings arising in
or related to such cases, (3) expeditious disposition of all matters arising in
or related to bankruptcy cases, and (4) attracting the best qualified judges to
the bankruptcy court. On the other hand, if the bankruptcy court is required
to wait indefinitely until the district court tries any cases for which a jury
demand is properly made, the inevitable consequences of such bifurcation
will be delay in the administration of bankruptcy cases, loss and/or
depreciation of assets of the estate, and less probability of obtaining
confirmation of reorganization plans under Chapter 11. Furthermore,
bankruptcy trustees desiring to pursue any preference or fraudulent transfer
actions that are subject to a trial by jury are likely to encounter the same
delay that had been considered as one of the major problems of the
antiquated summary/plenary jurisdictional scheme under the Bankruptcy Act.
The United States is now in a recession. There were 782,960 bankruptcy
cases filed during the 1990 calendar year, and, on December 31, 1990, there
were 1,033,230 cases pending.43 Every day, thousands of creditors and
debtors have their legal disputes adjudicated in the bankruptcy court. The
time has come to create a bankruptcy court constitutionally equipped to serve
the growing number of litigants crowding into the bankruptcy courtrooms.
According to one authority:
39 U.S. CONST. art. IlI, § 1.
' Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 57-60
(1982).
"' O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 531 (1933) (quoting The Declaration
of Independence (U.S. 1776)).
42 THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 491 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
"' Federal Judicial Workload Statistics at 58, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (Dec.
31, 1990).
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Viewing bankruptcy courts as courts of equity operating outside of the
scope of the seventh amendment is no longer accurate. Instead,
bankruptcy courts are courts of law and equity authorized to hear matters
retaining their legal nature even though asserted in bankruptcy
proceedings. Consequently, the Constitution requires that jury trial rights
in these cases be recognized, whether or not Congress statutorily
acknowledges the existence of such rights.' 4
Returning to the pre-Code dichotomy of summary/plenary jurisdiction
would be ridiculous; the core/noncore distinction will be rendered
unnecessary if an article I bankruptcy court is created; the current
bifurcation of bankruptcy cases between the bankruptcy court and the district
court constitutes duplicity and judicial waste; jury trials of bankruptcy
proceedings in the district court will cause prejudicial delay to debtors and
creditors; and Representative Kindness's argument that the Rolls Royce
choice is too expensive45 no longer applies since the salary of a bankruptcy
judge now constitutes ninety-two percent of the salary of a federal district
court judge. It is the author's assertion, however, that our judicial system
should be the Rolls Royce for it is the pearl of our democratic society, that
the salary and prestige of approximately 300 bankruptcy judges vis-a-vis that
of the other federal judges should not be determinative of such a significant
national issue, and that the recent increase in salary of 435 Representatives
from $96,600 to $125,100 unmistakably reveals Congress's decision to give
themselves the Rolls Royces and Cadillacs in Washington, while leaving the
bankruptcy courts temporarily, inefficiently, and perhaps unconstitutionally
"tuned-up."
The argument in favor of creating an independent article III bankruptcy
court is not new. In a recent law review article authored by Peter Rodino
(former Chairman of the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee) and
Alan Parker (former General Counsel for the Judiciary Committee), an
article III bankruptcy court was urged as the simplest and best solution. This
article included the following important statement:
It needs to be remembered that the concept of a bankruptcy court that is
separate and independent has been supported through the years almost
universally by those who have studied and used the bankruptcy system.
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws proposed such a separate
system. The National Bankruptcy Conference, the Commercial Law
"Gibson, Jury Trials in Bankruptcy: Obeying the Commands of Article III and the
Seventh Amendment, 72 MINN. L. REv. 967, 1053 (1988).
4s See supra note 9.
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League of America, the American Bankers Association, the American Bar
Association, and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York all
called for the creation of an independent bankruptcy court. In all of the
thirty-five days of hearings in the House of Representatives and the twenty
days of hearings in the Senate, not one witness reached a conclusion that
the old bankruptcy system should be retained. The only opposition to the
creation of an independent bankruptcy court came from the Judicial
Conference. '
Similarly, a well-known bankruptcy attorney testified in Congress in 1982 as
follows:
I would respectfully submit that in these cases, the independence and
prestige of the bankruptcy court is important. Bankers do not understand
why multimillion dollar issues involving the availability of setoff, adequate
protection of property interests, availability of cash to distressed
companies-issues of life and death for industrial enterprises of the size
of Wickes Corporation, Itel, White Motor, Penn-Dixie Industries, Braniff,
McAlloy Steel, McLoth Steel, AM International, Saxon Industries-why
these issues should be determined by non-tenured quasi-magistrates. 7
Finally, in focusing directly on the issue of jury trials, Professor Gibson
of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill wrote:
Congress wisely decided in 1978 to consolidate all bankruptcy-related
matters in the bankruptcy court. It should not undercut that policy by
retaining a clumsy and inefficient court structure that requires some
matters to be tried in the district court and forces the bankruptcy
proceeding into abeyance while awaiting the district court's decision.
Instead, in recognition of the need to execute the seventh amendment's
requirements efficiently, Congress should reconstitute the bankruptcy
courts as article III courts with full powers to conduct jury trials in all
types of bankruptcy proceedings.'
An article 11 bankruptcy court is by far the most appropriate solution
to the jury trial question and to the overall jurisdictional framework.
However, if this solution is not adopted, perhaps a Speedy Bankruptcy Act,
"' Rodino & Parker, The Simplest Solution, 7 BANKR. DEv. J. 329, 333 (1990).
47 H. REP. No. 807, to accompany H.R. 6978, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1982)
(statement of H. Minkel).
41 Gibson, supra note 44, at 1054.
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analogous to the Speedy Trial Act,49 is in order. More specifically, if the
bankruptcy judges are not to be made article III judges with life tenure, then
let the district judges conduct all bankruptcy proceedings in which a jury trial
is properly requested. Furthermore, in order not to delay the administration
of bankruptcy cases, and in order not to decrease the possibility of success
in Chapter 11 cases, it is suggested that such a Speedy Bankruptcy Act
require the district judges to begin the actual trials of such jury proceedings
within ninety days of the jury trial demand (even if more district judges must
be appointed to effectuate this provision).
The importance of the Speedy Trial Act is duly recognized, and there
is no question that there is a significant difference between the loss of liberty
and the entitlement to monetary damages. However, this nation is now in the
throes of severe economic adversity, many of the largest employers in the
United States are filing Chapter 11 bankruptcies, and consumer bankruptcies
abound. The Supreme Court has declared that, under certain circumstances
in bankruptcy proceedings, the seventh amendment right to a jury trial is
guaranteed.' The question is where will that jury trial occur? Thousands
of debtors, creditors, and other parties in bankruptcy cases should not have
to wait at the end of the line, even if those first in line are the criminally
accused in our society. This article is not in any way advocating less
protection for the accused, for such protection is the hallmark of our judicial
system. However, the protection for the criminally accused must be properly
balanced with the rights of innocent Americans who are parties in bankruptcy
cases and proceedings. Thus, in order to facilitate the proper administration
of the vast number of complicated bankruptcy cases, to preserve the right
under the seventh amendment to a trial by jury, and to protect property rights
and interests of the multitude of parties in bankruptcy cases, it is proposed
that speedy adjudication of jury trial proceedings be effected. In all
probability, without a Speedy Bankruptcy Act, jury trials of bankruptcy
proceedings will be placed at the end of the district court calendar and
significant rights and interests will be lost or substantially prejudiced by
delay.
Again, article III is the most appropriate solution. However, if that route
is not chosen, and if the alternative proposal of a Speedy Bankruptcy Act is
not enacted, a third approach could be for Congress to expressly grant
authority for bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials in core proceedings
and, with the consent of all parties, in noncore proceedings. Such a provision
should not violate article III of the Constitution or the seventh amendment,
49 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-3156, 3161-3174 (1990).
1 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989).
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according to the constitutional analysis provided by the Second Circuit in Ben
Cooper,5 as set forth earlier in this Article. With respect to jury trials of
noncore proceedings, the appellate courts are in accord that they cannot be
conducted without consent in the bankruptcy court because the
"reexamination clause" of the seventh amendment would be violated when
the bankruptcy court jury verdicts are reviewed de novo by the district court
under 28 U.S.C. section 157(c)(1). 2 Therefore, under this proposal,
nonconsensual noncore jury proceedings would be tried in the district court,
subject to the same requirement of the Speedy Bankruptcy Act described
above-namely, that the trial actually begin in the district court within ninety
days of the jury trial demand. As suggested above, the legislation could
include an express provision, similar to that with respect to the federal
magistrates,' whereby jury trials of noncore proceedings could be
conducted in the bankruptcy court with the consent of all parties.' A jury
verdict in the bankruptcy court then would not be subject to reexamination
by the district court, functioning in its appellate capacity."
In conclusion, where jury trials will occur in bankruptcy proceedings
must be determined immediately. Three options have been proposed: article
M is the best; the other two alternatives are feasible. Congressional action
is mandated now-judges, lawyers, debtors, creditors, employers, employees,
individuals, partnerships, corporations, all are waiting to learn where the
seventh amendment right to a jury trial may be actualized without substantial
prejudice to the rights and interests of parties in bankruptcy cases.
Unfortunately, Congress failed to create an article III bankruptcy court in
1978 and in 1984 because of politics as well as the prestige and ego of many
federal judges. 6 The time has come to constitutionally codify and dignify
s1 896 F.2d 1394, 1403-04 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 3269, vacated and
remanded, 111 S. Ct. 425 (1990), opinion reinstated, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2041 (1991).
1 In re Cinematronics, Inc., 916 F.2d 1444, 1451 (9th Cir. 1990); Beard v.
Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 443 (3d Cir. 1990).
5 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3), (c)(1).
I Under current law, it appears that 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) permits the jury trial of
noncore proceedings in the bankruptcy court with the consent of all parties. However,
an express provision in the legislation proposed by this third alternative would clarify
congressional intent with respect to jury trials of all types of bankruptcy proceedings in
one section of Title 28 of the United States Code.
5s 28 U.S.C. § 158.
56
[I]n 1977 when H.R. 8200 was considered and passed by the House of
Representatives it included an article III bankruptcy court. The Judicial Conference
and former Chief Justice Warren Burger, however, were more successful in lobbying
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the role of the bankruptcy court in presiding over cases affecting millions of
individuals and businesses throughout this country-an awesome
responsibility. The time has come to preserve the sanctity and integrity of
our entire federal judicial system by taking appropriate congressional action.
We need an article IlI bankruptcy court! Creating an article III bankruptcy
court is a permanent solution (instead of a "tuneup") that will facilitate the
availability of jury trials in bankruptcy proceedings by giving the bankruptcy
judges complete control over their calendars. It also will have the effects of
judicial economy (since the core/noncore distinction will no longer apply and
the district courts will not be required to review proposed findings de novo),
and of avoiding much unnecessary litigation concerning whether a particular
proceeding is core or noncore, or in which forum a jury trial should be
conducted. Finally, it will efficiently and constitutionally reconcile the
purposes of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act57 with the holdings in
Marathon58 and Granfinanciera,59 article III of the Constitution, and the
seventh amendment.
the Senate, and a compromise was reached which created a nonarticle III court. It
was this compromised court structure that was held unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.
Rodino & Parker, supra note 46, at 334.
57 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
58 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
59 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
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